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Introduction 
This paper will evaluate the effectiveness of the Treaty Between The Government Of 
Canada And The Government Of The United States Of America Concerning Pacific Salmon. 
Comparing the treaty against a backdrop of theoretical expectations for international agreements, 
I find that many of the theory-predicted outcomes hold true. The agreement expects both Canada 
and the United States to come together to set annual quotas on the amount of salmon to be caught 
by each party with the goal of  mitigating the overfishing and staving off eventual depletion of 
the salmon stocks of both countries. It lacks many of the attributes that theory points to as 
significant contributors to treaty effectiveness. Analyzing data on salmon harvest before and 
after the treaty, I find that the agreement was ineffective and, while we saw changes in the 
behaviors of both countries, those changes came about as a result of external factors. 
 
Theory 
 Before we move into the specifics of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, it is important that we 
establish a theoretical framework around negotiations of international agreements within which 
to conduct our analysis. What follows is an summation of relevant theory that serves to explain 
the behavior of states in international agreements. 
 The most difficult environmental treaties and international agreements exist to solve a 
dilemma in which two or more states have conflicting interests that lead to behaviors that 
negatively affect all states involved. The problems that are easiest to solve are those in which 
countries' interests are closely aligned or identical. As interests become increasingly 
heterogeneous, the likelihood of cooperation decreases significantly (Miles et al. 2002, 15).  This 
situation is explained by Garrett Hardin as a phenomenon he refers to as the Tragedy of the 
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Commons. Hardin (1968) says that in a Tragedy of the Commons, two or more actors have 
unrestricted access to some public good. Ellis defines a public good saying that the use of the 
resource by one actor prohibits its use by another actor, but any unused portions of the resource 
are available to other actors (Ellis 2004, 30). A self-interested actor has an incentive to consume 
as much of the resource as possible because additional units of consumption come at little to no 
cost to the individual. However, this behavior results in what Hardin refers to as the tragedy: 
every actor behaving in a self-interested manner consumes unsustainable amounts of the resource 
and the resource is depleted (Hardin 1968, 39). This lack of incentives to encourage more 
sustainable behaviors is the primary motivator for the negotiation and implementation of 
environmental international agreements. In the absence of an incentive adjusting international 
agreement, or in the presence of an ineffective one, these negative incentives contribute to 
environmental degradation as resources are overused and depleted. 
 
Theory: Negotiation of International Agreements 
 Treaty negotiation is a complicated process. Bringing nations with varied interests 
together to mutually agree to solve some issue presents a number of obstacles, the first of which 
is engaging countries in the discussion. When negotiating an international treaty, it is important 
to create equitable obligations as countries must expect some benefit from an agreement if we 
expect them to participate (Brown-Weiss and Jacobsen 1998, 552). As we will discuss shortly, 
treaties lacking equitable obligations tend to experience ineffectiveness upon implementation. 
Additionally, treaty requirements should act in coordination with relevant economic incentives to 
encourage compliance (Brown-Weiss and Jacobsen 1998, 552). It is common in international 
environmental politics to have a treaty whose obligations are at odds with economic stimuli as 
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sustainability and development are so frequently at odds (World Commission on Environment 
and Development 1987, 184). By working with natural economic forces, or creating them 
through the agreement, you boost the likelihood of success as motivations for compliance are 
increased. 
 Edward Miles puts forth some other factors inhibiting the treaty negotiation process. He 
points to the decision making process both in the development of the treaty and in the treaty 
itself as a limitation on the possible bargaining range available to negotiators. Miles uses the 
concept of the Pareto Frontier (a point at which no one can be made better off without making 
another worse off) to explain the best arrangements available through negotiation (Miles et al. 
2002, 9). While it makes intuitive sense that no country would settle for a bargain that makes 
them worse off than no bargain at all, the Pareto Frontier reduces the opportunity for agreements 
to entirely solve an environmental issue, and its use in international negotiations implies the 
ability of agreements to address an issue will be limited to parties' cost/benefit analyses.  
 A final factor in treaty negotiation is time. Christian Downie believes that prolonged 
periods of negotiation impact the aspects of the resulting treaty—"there are strategic 
opportunities in the course of protracted negotiation for actors to steer negotiations toward their 
preferred outcomes" (Downie 2012, 296). In addition to countries having more time to push their 
own agendas, extended negotiations provide for context shifts to be included in the creation of 
the treaty. Changes in the global political and economic situations affect countries' negotiating 
positions and in turn can change aspects of the resulting treaty (Downie 2012, 306). As a result, 
we can expect treaties that are negotiated over a shorter time span to be more effective than their 
longer negotiated counterparts because members will have less time to manipulate the guidelines 
of the treaty to their own ends. 
McIntosh 4 
 
Theory: Attributes of Effective International Agreements   
Edith Brown-Weiss and Harold Jacobsen believe that there are three categories of 
strategies that, when included in an international agreement, can encourage members to comply 
with the terms. The first category is what they call "sunshine methods," that bring light to 
member behavior and increase domestic pressure from interest groups and non-governmental 
organizations to comply. The second category given is positive incentives that reward members 
for abiding by treaty requirements. The third is coercive actions that directly punish countries 
that fail to comply with treaty requirements (Brown-Weiss and Jacobsen 1998, 542). The 
presence of these factors in an international environmental agreement is useful in obtaining the 
cooperation of members because they correct incentives to continue destructive behaviors.  
Time since implementation has an impact on the effectiveness of treaties. Miles says "we 
would expect the effectiveness of a regime to increase when it has had the time to mature…we 
would expect the typical pattern [of effectiveness] to be curvilinear—increasing as the regime 
matures, but diminishing as it ages into obsolescence" (Miles et al. 2002, 13). We expect the 
lifespan of a good treaty to look something like the following: low effectiveness when the issue 
is salient, but countries have not had the opportunity or motivation to adjust behaviors yet; high 
effectiveness when the issue is still salient and the full force of the agreement has been brought 
into effect; and low effectiveness again when the issue fades from public importance or treaty 
requirements become outdated or irrelevant. 
The size of the membership to the treaty also has an impact on its expected success. 
Treaties with fewer members allow for much easier monitoring, and leave fewer opportunities 
for cheating and free-riding, than agreements that include larger bodies of membership (Brown-
Weiss and Jacobsen 1998, 521). For treaties addressing particularly difficult issues, working with 
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a small number of countries that are able to hold each other accountable can augment 
effectiveness. 
 
Theory: Situational Factors Contributing to International Agreement Effectiveness 
 Ronald Mitchell believes countries' post-treaty behaviors are dictated by normative forces 
that encourage continuation of pre-treaty behaviors. He says "Governments…need stronger 
arguments to reject a norm that they have previously supported and urged others to support" 
(Mitchell 2007, 908). This sentiment is echoed by Brown-Weiss and Jacobsen's point that 
"traditional behavior is related to a country's culture. Culture provides a context and springboard 
for what a country does" (Brown-Weiss and Jacobsen 1998, 530). It is clear that the norms 
present in a country affect that country's compliance with a particular international agreement, 
but it is difficult to predict if its effect is positive or negative: culture can either encourage or 
discourage compliance among treaty members depending on their positions before the treaty was 
negotiated. 
 Miles also puts forth an explanation as to why treaties are effective. He says that while 
the majority of environmental agreements fail to achieve their goals, many do affect the behavior 
of their members in the direction intended (Miles et al. 2002, 456). Miles points to the "processes 
of regime formation and implementation" as having a major impact on country behavior 
following treaty enactment, stating "governments as well as societies quite often make unilateral 
adjustments in response to new ideas and information" (Miles et al. 2002, 457). Even if 
international agreements exceed the capacity of member countries to solve the issues at hand, 
their process of development encourages steps in the right direction. 
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Theory: Attributes of Ineffective International Agreements 
 Environmental treaties that fail to address conflicting incentives often also fail to correct 
the environmental harms taking place. Using the phrase "problems of incongruity" to refer to 
these conflicting incentives, Miles states that one reason countries find themselves in 
problematic situations is because "the cost-benefit calculus of an individual actor is 
systematically biased in favor of either the costs or the benefits of a particular course of action" 
(Miles et al. 2002, 17). Absent intervention, countries have incentives to continue their poor 
behaviors and treaties that fail to account for this are unlikely to enjoy success. Miles thinks that 
we can expect noncompliant behavior in response to treaties that address "problems of 
incongruity," stating that postagreement implications include persistence of "incentives to 
unilaterally defect" when there are no treaty mechanisms for transparency, monitoring, or 
enforcement of treaty requirements (Miles et al. 2002, 21). 
Many countries also act in accordance with some abstract notion of fairness. Actors are 
less likely to continue or begin implementation of international agreements whose obligations are 
not equitable (Brown-Weiss and Jacobsen 1998, 523). While the range of inequity countries are 
willing to accept will vary depending on the negotiating position of the nation in question, we 
can reasonable assume that unfair treaties are less likely to achieve their goals. 
 
Theory: Situational Factors Contributing to International Agreement Ineffectiveness 
 States tend to be rational actors. They consider the actions available to them, and choose 
the ones with the lowest costs relative to benefits. Countries acting in accordance with their 
cost/benefit incentives opens up a possibility for them to refuse to comply with agreements that 
have high costs, as many environmental agreements do (Mitchell 2007, 908-09).  
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 Another factor in the effectiveness of treaties is the nature of the problem itself. Problems 
that are more intellectually complicated and don't have a solution readily available, or problems 
whose solution is beyond the capacity of parties to the treaty are more likely to be doomed to 
failure (Miles et al. 2002, 3). This makes intuitive sense; the easier a problem is to solve, the 
more likely it is that problem-solving strategies will be effective.  
 
Theory: Summary 
In sum, we see that agreements exist to address situations in which countries have 
heterogeneous incentives, such as in the Tragedy of the Commons. When addressing these 
incentives, it is important that negotiations take steps to ensure equitable requirements and work 
with economic forces rather than against them in order to maximize potential success. 
Negotiations are also limited by a Pareto Frontier: beyond the Pareto Frontier, countries have 
no incentive to continue negotiating because at least one of them would be better off in the 
current situation. The time period over which negotiations take place is also a relevant factor in 
how treaties are formed, with greater effectiveness expected from treaties negotiated in a shorter 
time frame. 
We have also developed a short list of attributes of international agreements that tend to 
contribute to success and attributes that tend to inhibit it. A treaty from which we can expect 
perfect effectiveness would contain: one or more of Brown-Weiss and Jacobsen's compliance 
encouraging strategies, requirements that are quickly implementable and solve the problem while 
the issue remains salient, and few parties to the agreement. Furthermore, treaties that are in some 
way interconnected with a network of relevant and easy to solve issues are expected to see a high 
degree of success. Conversely, a treaty that will experience poor compliance and goal 
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achievement will fail to account for heterogeneous incentives of member countries from the 
outset or have unfair or inequitable obligations. 
Additionally, we have established a set of contextual circumstances which we expect to 
contribute to and detract from treaty effectiveness. One situational element with a positive effect 
on treaty effectiveness is the process of treaty development and negotiation. Domestic and global 
norms can have ambiguous effects on countries' behaviors in response to a treaty. On the other 
hand, strong economic incentives to defect from the agreement, or issues that are divisive or 
difficult to solve from the beginning will restrain treaty effectiveness. 
 
Methods 
This paper will examine the outcomes of the Pacific Salmon Treaty between the United 
States and Canada to analyze the real-world applications of the theory given above. Once an 
agreement has been negotiated, countries are still faced with the formidable task of implementing 
the treaty and ensuring fellow actors' compliance. But how do we know when a treaty has been 
effective? As Miles says "measuring the effectiveness of a particular regime…leaves a much 
larger role for subjective judgment" (Miles et al. 2002, 49).  
To solve this issue, Miles provides us a measure treaty effectiveness that works by 
examining the agreement at three distinct steps. First, we look to the treaty itself, and the rules 
imposed by it. Second, we explore the actions countries take in response to the treaty. Third, we 
analyze the environmental reaction to the treaty (Miles et al. 2002, 6). These three steps provide 
us with a guide to considering whether or not a treaty was effective on the whole. While there are 
arenas in which to analyze the extent to which an international environmental agreement helped 
solve an environmental issue, the analysis in this paper is limited in scope to the impact the 
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agreement had on the behavior of member states, and so we will focus on Miles' second step of 
considering reactions to the agreement. With this in mind, we must compare actual country 
behavior in response to the treaty with the hypothetical actions we would expect them to take 
with no treaty in place (Miles et al. 2002, 52). 
To measure the influence of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, this paper will use data on salmon 
catch in the years leading up to, and following, its signing. While the treaty's limits on salmon 
catch by its members varies year to year, we can expect to see a general decline in salmon catch 
by its members after the treaty as the annual quotas established are created with sustainability in 
mind. Using Miles' hypothetical comparison measure of effectiveness, we can compare the 
United States' and Canada's real catch of salmon in the years following the treaty to a 
counterfactual estimate of levels of salmon harvest in the absence of the treaty. Significant 
differences between the counterfactual and real behaviors imply at least some treaty 
effectiveness. 
 
Case Study: Background 
 The Treaty Between The Government Of Canada And The Government Of The United 
States Of America Concerning Pacific Salmon was born as a result of "salmon wars" between the 
two countries in the 1970's and 80's (Huppert 1995, 4). The fundamental problem arises from the 
migration patterns of pacific salmon. Many of the rivers through which pacific salmon migrate 
travel through the borders of each country and empty into the Pacific Ocean. While occasional 
salmon harvests on transboundary rivers was an issue, the main controversy came about when 
salmon would finish their journey to the Pacific Ocean; once in the ocean, there is no way to 
identify the salmon by country, and as a result salmon from both countries were being 
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intercepted by the other (Huppert 1995, 5). Consequentially, both countries felt they were being 
cheated out of their rightful salmon harvests and began implementing measures to right that 
wrong including transit fees and increased fleet sizes designed to maximize domestic harvest 
while limiting possible interceptions by the other country (Huppert 1995, 4).  
 Eventually, the two countries agreed to negotiate a solution to the issue. Talks began in 
the early 1980's and culminated in the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty (Huppert 1995, 8). Notably, 
during this period, "a sudden shift in ocean conditions contributed to a marked increase in 
[Canadian salmon]…This shift surely strengthened Canada's hand in the negotiations" (Miller 
2002, 6). The resulting agreement intended to prevent overfishing and provide each country an 
equitable portion of the catch (Huppert 1995, 8). It establishes a Commission in which both 
countries have equal representation. The Commission, using data from panels localized to 
individual rivers and previous years' available and caught salmon, establishes annual harvest 
quotas for each country. These quotas are non-binding, and the treaty does not have any 
monitoring or enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance (Pacific Salmon Commission 
1985). The over fishing and "cheating" of both countries prior to the agreement motivated the 
formation of the treaty, but they also provide us with a method of analysis for treaty 
effectiveness: both countries overfished without the treaty, so we would expect an effective 
treaty to be one that sees overfishing slowed or stopped after its implementation. 
 
 
Case Study: Post-Treaty Behaviors 
 Between 1975 and 1985, we saw a notable rise in salmon catch by both the United States 
and Canada as demonstrated in Figures 1 and 2. Both nearly tripled their salmon harvesting over 
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that decade. After the treaty, we would expect a reduction in salmon catch. If the treaty is 
effective, the annual harvest will still vary depending on the quota set by the committee and the 
available salmon, but we can expect that each year's catch will fall within a range that allows the 
salmon populations to recover. This effect might be distorted a bit according to Miles' curvilinear 
expectations of effectiveness (Miles et al. 2002, 13). It may take a few years, but after the treaty 
requirements have been fully implemented, compliance should be in full force. We should not 
see any of the drastic jumps after the treaty that we saw before. In actuality, the catch did level 
off a least a little bit. Although it seems Canada performed much better than the United States, 
both countries caught below the predicted harvest levels represented by the counterfactual lines 
in Figure 3. On average, the United States has remained around the same level as its 1985 catch 
while Canada has reduced catch to below 1975 levels.  
 Additionally, looking at Figure 4, we see that countries that are members to the 
agreement ballooned from less than a quarter of worldwide catch in 1975 to more than a third in 
1985. In 2005, twenty years after the application of the treaty, the member countries' portion of 
the worldwide catch has shrunk back down, though not quite to the levels we saw them at in 
1975. Because the proportions reflected in a given year are not controlled for available salmon, it 
is important to note that rather than compare the raw numbers of each country in a given year, 
we should compare the catches of one country to the global total. That will give us a better 
estimate of how many salmon were caught versus how many were available, though it does not 
control for country specific factors like fleet size. Figure 4 shows that Canada has done a much  
better job of limiting its salmon harvest since 1985 than the United States, though both countries 
have seen reductions. Canada's harvest decline could seem like the natural result of overfishing 
in isolation: as salmon are harvested today, there are fewer salmon to harvest tomorrow. 
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Figure 1 (Data provided by Mitchell) 
 
 
Figure 2 (Data provided by Mitchell) 
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Figure 3 (Data provided by Mitchell) 
 
 
Figure 4 (Data provided by Mitchell) 
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However, when Canada's catch is held up against the American catch or the global total, it seems 
as though fish were available to be caught, but Canada refrained. This suggests at least some 
treaty effectiveness. The bottom line seems to be that Canada has seen a significant decrease in 
salmon harvest since treaty implementation, while the United States has experienced little to no 
change. Below, we consider why this may be the case.  
 
Case Study: Explanation of Behaviors 
Before we attribute the behavior  change to the effectiveness of the treaty, we should look 
for other factors explaining reduced salmon harvest the post-treaty period. Comparing the results 
in Figure 2 to the data provided by Gunnar Knapp in Figure 5, we see a negative correlation 
between prices and salmon catch. Even though the law of supply predicts that higher prices 
generate higher catches by fishermen trying to take advantage of those higher prices (Fair et al. 
2014, 37), we see that some of the highest salmon prices accompany some of the lowest harvest 
years. One possible explanation is that the high prices came about as a result of the scarcity of 
salmon: the fishermen did not increase catch in high price years because there were not any more 
salmon to catch. This position is supported by statistics provided by Peter Vitousek: "As of 1995, 
22% of recognized marine fisheries were overexploited or already depleted, and 44% more were 
at their limit of exploitation' (Vitousek 1997, 495). Under this assumption, it looks like the treaty 
did not have any effect since the United States simply continued fishing until it was no longer 
possible rather than abiding by sustainable quotas. Even though a cursory glance indicates treaty 
effectiveness because both countries stopped increasing their catches, it seems the more likely 
explanation is that the US has hovered around the maximum catch possible, which happened to 
be around its 1985 level.  
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Figure 5 (Graph by Gunnar Knapp) 
 
 
As Argue and Shepard point out, the United States' engagement with the issue of over 
fishing of Pacific salmon was largely economically driven (Argue and Shepard 2005, 96). This is 
demonstrated by the arguments put forth by the United States during treaty negotiations. For 
example, Argue and Shepard claim that the United States was initially in favor of an "equitable 
balance" system that would compensate each state for interceptions of their salmon in the other. 
When reports came back that the pre-treaty arrangement was in the favor of the United States, 
American negotiators began changing the boundaries of the agreement, most notably claiming 
that the "Fraser [River] was an international rather than a Canadian river," (Argue and Shepard 
2005, 97) in order to negate Fraser River interceptions made by the United States. This 
demonstrates the United States' commitment to increasing its own salmon catch, unfettered by 
interceptions in Canadian territories. This is corroborated by Daniel Huppert's claim that "[the 
McIntosh 16 
 
top two reasons for the United States to sign the treaty were] (1) to maintain a stable level of US 
fishing of Fraser River sockeye and pink salmon, (2) to conserve salmon of the transboundary 
rivers for Alaskan fisheries…" (emphasis added) (Huppert 1995, 9). The United States was 
committed to making sure their salmon made it to Alaska so they could reap the benefits of the 
salmon rather than splitting them with Canada. 
Canada, on the other hand, has managed to reduce its own catch and fish at what are 
apparently sustainable levels. Again, Mitchell provides an explanation, stating that "the desire to 
be viewed by domestic and international audiences as a good environmental citizen may lead 
some governments to give little if any thought to violating an agreement" (Mitchell 2007, 903). 
It's possible that Canada's calls for sustainable fishing practices throughout the negotiation 
process committed Canada to a position that was later too difficult to renege on (Argue and 
Shepard 2005, 65). After all, as noted above Canada was in a much better bargaining position 
during treaty negotiations, making it much easier to focus on values of sustainability. However, a 
more likely explanation is that Canada simply ran out of fish to catch. Miller states that, despite 
outlier years, Canada's salmon stocks were steadily declining leading up to the treaty and "by the 
late 1990s it had become apparent that many of British Columbia's southern and interior Coho 
stocks were severely depleted" (Miller 2002, 8). The declining availability of salmon was 
exacerbated in the mid 1990s by the explosion in Alaska salmon (outlined below): U.S. vessels 
greatly increased fishing in the ocean around Alaska which resulted in increased incidental catch 
of Canadian salmon reaching the end of their migration (Miller 2002, 10). The data in Figures 1 
and 2 shows that after the agreement was reached Canada immediately reduced its salmon 
harvest and continued reducing through the 1990's and 2000's. Canada's lack of access to salmon 
seems to have forced its compliance. 
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Why would the two countries sign a voluntary treaty that they would not comply with? 
Ronald Mitchell provides a potential answer, stating "commitments may go unfulfilled 
because…actors calculate costs and benefits and find the former to exceed the latter" (Mitchell 
2007, 908-09). The cynic would say that the each country likely signed the treaty to preserve 
salmon as an economic resource for itself, and then violated the terms of the agreement when it 
stood to make greater economic gains from continued over fishing than political losses from 
cheating. It seems that changing economic incentives discouraged cooperation in later stages of 
the agreement. Miller validates this explaining that environmental changes have had a significant 
effect on the distribution of salmon. As a result of El Niño weather shifts, the number of Alaskan 
salmon jumped ten-fold, resulting in record harvest levels in 1993, 1994, and 1995, and "the 
1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty…[was not] well designed to accommodate such changes. As 
incentives to cooperate shifted, disputes ensued" (Miller 2002, 1, 8). This is a textbook example 
of Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons. In the context of this treaty, each country has 
unrestricted access to the salmon that cross into their territory. They have an incentive to 
"outfish" the other country in order to maximize their own benefit. In the end, the salmon are 
over fished and driven to near extinction. In short, non-compliance with the treaty was exactly 
what was predicted  because of the economic interests in continued over fishing. 
Additionally, the treaty's basis in fairness and equity may have proved its undoing. Lack 
of monitoring or enforcement mechanisms in the treaty encouraged both parties to respond to 
perceived cheating with cheating of their own, or abandonment of the agreement entirely. This is 
particularly evident in the wake of the mid 1990s surge in Alaskan salmon. As the U.S. increased 
their catch to take advantage of the more abundant salmon, their interception of Canadian salmon 
increased as well. This led to Canada feeling cheated and, unable to increase their own fishing, 
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calling for renegotiation of the agreement (resulting in the 1999 amendments to the treaty) 
(Miller 2002, 10). It seems both countries were expecting to move beyond Miles' Pareto 
Frontier outcome and make themselves better off at the expense of the other, with Canada 
paying the price. 
The 1999 amendments to the treaty are important for several reasons. First, and most 
obvious, they provide additional evidence that the original agreement was ineffective. The 
agreement failed to account for changes in the amount of fish harvestable per boat, something 
that "increased dramatically" between 1985 and 1995 (Schwindt et al. 2000, 27). But it seems the 
treaty would have been ineffective even without spikes in harvesting ability. Miller says "it 
appears [the members] achieved a solution only after there was a significant shift in bargaining 
objectives coupled with a new-found willingness to try more flexible tools to achieve equity 
objectives" (Miller 2002, 10). To solve the over fishing issue, the two countries had to 
renegotiate the agreement to include other elements of treaty effectiveness. 
Among the factors added by the 1999 amendments was one prescribed by Brown-Weiss 
and Jacobsen treaty success: equitable obligations. Prior to the amendments, there were those 
that felt Canada was being treated unfairly. For example, Grafton and Lane say "we believe 
changes in management could significantly improve the economic viability and the sustainability 
of [Canadian] fisheries," going on to claim that the treaty should move to equitable salmon 
distribution according to "rights-based management" (Grafton and Lane 1998, 134). Some of the 
1999 requirements included a tit-for-tat fishery operation system which requested both countries' 
fisheries close for seven days if projected total catch for the year fell below 1.1 million, though 
notably requiring United States fisheries to close first (Pacific Salmon Commission 1999, 
Attachment B). Another obligation outlined in 1999 was the United States' annual contribution 
McIntosh 19 
 
of a total of 140 million USD to two funds geared towards the "restoration and enhancement" of 
salmon populations in both countries (Pacific Salmon Commission 1999, Attachment C).  
The treaty does not provide any reason for the United States being the sole contributor to 
the funds, but it is possible that this particular expectation stems from the United States receiving 
significantly more economic benefit from Pacific salmon at the time of the amendments. As 
Schwindt (2000) points out, at the time of the amendments Canada was generating a negative 
balance between purely economic costs and benefits of sustainable salmon stock management, 
likely motivating the expectation for the United States to step up to the table, so to speak 
(Schwindt et al. 2000, 42). The funding clause is backed up in the 2002 communications 
between Canadian Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Robert Thibault, and United States 
Secretary of State Colin Powell. In one letter, Robert Thibault says that a lack of United States 
contribution in a particular year will lead to the suspension of the treaty obligations for both 
countries (Thibault 2002, 2), demonstrating Canada's commitment to preventing the United 
States from continued overuse without contribution to a solution. 
It seems clear that the 1999 amendments to the treaty existed to protect Canadian 
interests in the agreement while correcting several of the equity issues present in the original 
negotiations. With the drastic changes in salmon available to both countries, Canada became 
what Sprinz and Vaahtoranta refer to as an environmental "pusher": a country whose low 
abatement costs and high ecological vulnerability encourage them to push for stringent 
requirements in environmental agreements (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994, 81). As Canada was 
rapidly losing its ability to fish anyway, its opportunity cost of reducing its catch was far lower 
than when Canadian salmon were abundant. As a result the 1999 amendments to the agreement 
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created increasingly environmentally responsible requirements in addition to setting more 
equitable obligations which theory predicts will lead to greater future effectiveness. 
 
Findings 
 As a case study, the Pacific Salmon Treaty seems to be about as effective as theory would 
predict. It has many of the elements covered above (including being a Tragedy of the Commons, 
and shifting bargaining positions during negotiations), but all in all it lacks too many of the 
aspects of successful treaties, while embracing too many of the ineffective ones, to be expected 
to be successful. 
 While the Pacific Salmon Treaty was, on the whole, largely ineffective, it did include 
some elements of successful treaties. The treaty had few parties, which as Brown-Weiss and 
Jacobsen contend, would make monitoring easier if the treaty had required any. The agreement 
presents a relatively easy problem for solving by several high-capacity states, though the states 
did not follow through. Additionally, the treaty attempts to leverage global norms to encourage 
cooperation. Miles points out that "at least in the Western world, public demand for and 
governmental supply of environmental protection have increased significantly over the past three 
to four decades" (Miles et al. 2002, 439). Thus the treaty was in a position to put pressure on its 
members to comply if it had successfully wielded the global call for sustainability. 
The inclusion of some of the positive treaty attributes creates a compelling argument for 
the importance of the ones ignored. Many of the aspects of successful treaties listed above were 
lacking from this treaty (for example, the equitable obligations added in 1999). The treaty 
requires consensus for each decision made by its Commission. On the one hand, this results in all 
parties' satisfaction with the actions that are taken, on the other, it leads to vague guidelines as 
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more stringent expectations are bound to spark disagreement (Yanagida 1987, 585). The 
consensus requirement is doubly problematic because of the bargaining time required: "[the 
Commission] must make its decisions in a timely fashion if fishermen are to pursue their 
livelihood. The potential for stalemate could be an absolute barrier to the purpose of the whole 
body" (Yanagida 1987, 586). The nature of the issue in conjunction with the consensus 
requirement creates a possibility of the Commission "stalling out," when agreement cannot be 
reached but entire economic industries depend on the quotas published by the Commission. 
Additionally, the treaty failed to factor in differing incentives of its members. It assumed 
that each country valued conservation of salmon equally and completely ignored the economics 
of the situation. The agreement also failed to establish the equitable obligations necessary for 
effective treaties. While basing salmon quotas on the amount available in that particular river is a 
sound strategy for conservation, it does not account for how the quota will unequally impact the 
country within which that particular river runs. As we saw, this failure to create quotas that 
addressed varying river conditions led to the breakdown of the treaty. 
The agreement fell short in a number of other ways: it was negotiated over a long period 
of time (allowing countries to steer requirements in favorable directions), it lacked all three of 
Brown-Weiss and Jacobsen's compliance enhancing strategies, its requirements took too long to 
be implemented are were too rigid to adapt to changes in levels of available salmon, and it failed 
to correct for harmful economic incentives. The treaty's ineffectiveness despite employing some 
positive attributes like having few members and a favorable political climate reinforces the 
importance of the missing factors in creating an effective treaty. 
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Conclusion 
 Theory around international agreements provides us with a formula through which to 
predict the effectiveness of treaties. This formula includes factors that can promote or sabotage 
agreement effectiveness. When I apply this formula to the Pacific Salmon treaty, I find it 
accurately anticipates effectiveness. The Pacific Salmon treaty lacked many of the compliance 
encouraging factors given by the formula and ended up being largely ineffective. While we did 
see changes in behaviors of both the United States and Canada, the data points to both countries' 
behaviors having been influenced by factors other than the treaty. This particular case study 
supports the theoretical formula for determining treaty effectiveness. 
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